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ABSTRACT 
Global economy has formed a huge challenge to the trust of traditional business. It’s a important problem of all 
enterprise how to build a effective trust institution in the new economy. The rapid development of E-business is 
bringing a turning point of trust institution. In traditional trust institution, trust means that principal controls the agent in 
fact. The evolution of trust institution was closely related to the development of technology because of control. This 
paper presents, with the innovation of technology and system, precondition of trust through the method of controlling 
has already been out of the existence. The development of E-business will have influence on the evolution of trust 
institution, Advantages of E-business can promote monitor from man-made to market-made, from control to 
competition. It will build an effectual trust institution. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Global economy has formed a huge challenge to the 
trust of traditional business. It’s an important problem of 
all enterprise how to build an effective trust institution 
in the new economy. The rapid development of 
E-business is bringing a turning point of trust 
institution. 
 
2. THE PROBLEM AND CHALLENGE  
 
2.1 The traditional trust  
 
Trust is a definite expectation of other’s action 
(Gambetta, 1988) as well as an active ability that engage 
oneself to accept the many social institution (Zucker, 
1986). Trust is necessary to reduce transaction cost, and 
help business organizations operate better (Miles & 
Snow, 1992). Trust becomes a pivotal factor of the 
thought and philosophy of management (Miles & Greed, 
1995). Trust is rooting in three patterns: process based 
trust, character based trust, and institution based trust 
(Zucker, 1986). Institution, especial comparability and 
reciprocal experience decide the trust (Arrow, 1984). 
Trust was a situation that we relied on others; it meant 
dependence together with risk. Because calculativeness 
is ubiquitous (Williamson, 1998), the trust of coming 
from dependence means that principal controls the agent 
in fact. Trust is derived from distrust. The premise of 
trust is the exchange of direct interaction and sensing 
knowledge. So some scholars think that management is 
one art of control (Putti & Weihrich & Koontz, 1998).  
 
2.2 Trust and technology 
 
The evolution of trust institution is closely related to the 
development of technology because of control (Kipnis, 
1991). The development of technology is divided into 
three stages: skills based technology, which 
corresponding to the era of producing by hand; the 
routine technology, which corresponding to the era of 
producing by machines; informational technology, 
which corresponding to the era of producing by 
intelligence (Faunce, 1981). The principal cannot only 
simply rely on the agent’s moral because of the 
complicated technology. The dependence is more 
displayed that whether the agent can better deal with the 
technology, at this moment, the need of agent’s skills 
and moral improved highly. It was more difficult to 
control than before. Further more the way that 
technology used make the implied terms of traditional 
trust out of existing, more and more trades based on 
multi-region and provisional colony were substituted 
trades of self-region and steady colony (Kipnis, 1994), 
codified knowledge which is gradually replacing the 
sensual knowledge is becoming basis of the trade 
(Masahiko Aoki, 2001). 
 
3. TRUST IN E-BUSINESS: AN ADVERTISING 
GAME MODEL 
 
Because the traditional trust institution has relied on 
strong ethical hypothesis, it can be described as a game 
model. Players have all or part knowledge of the game 
structure. The trust institution is a common strategy 
choice of players, and it can be self-enforcing. We will 
analyze the trust institution by an advertising game 
model that is reformed by Spence’s job market model 
(Spence, 1974). 
 
3.1 Advertising game model 
 
Because of asymmetric information, bargainors know 
the quality level of their goods, buyers don’t. But the 
information of quality can be transferred to buyers by 
advertising. According to Spence-Mirrlees condition 
(Spence & Mirrlees, 1974), there are different costs of 
advertising between different quality. The cost of 
advertising is inverse ratio of quality. The efficiency 
improvement of different quality is different. 
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Thinking of a buyer and a bargainor. Quality has two 
estates: if 1=θ , the quality is low, if 2=θ , the 
quality is high. The bargainor is clear of the real value 
of θ , but the knowledge of the buyer is only the 
probabilities of quality. Let the probability is p: 
2/1)2()1( ==== θθ pp .Before contracting , the 
bargainor will select advertising level. Let the level is s: { }1,0∈s , 0=s means advertising, 1=s means no 
advertising. The cost of advertising is θθ /),( ssC = . 
After advertising is observed, the buyer will decide the 
price )( sw . The bargainor will choose whether 
receiving the price or not. If being received, the buyer 
has an expected value: θ=y (it is a hypothesis that 
advertising isn’t influence of value), the baigainor’s 
expected utility is θθ /),( swsU −= .The buyer’s 
expected utility is )(),( sws −= θθπ .Otherwise, 
0≡= πU . At one time, it is a hypothesis that there is 
a complete market, so when the market has an 
equilibrium, price will be equal to expected value and 
the buyer’s expected utility is 0.  
 
3.2 The game of trust in control  
 
The analysis of this game model has two angle of view: 
symmetric and asymmetric information games. By 
symmetric information, advertising needs many costs 
but has no value. So whether high with low of the 
quality, bargainor will choose 0=s , the price of low 
quality is 1)1( ==θw , the price of high quality is 
2)2( ==θw . There is trust institution in the market 
this time. But this Pareto dominance equilibrium will 
not exist in asymmetric information games. If the buyer 
doesn’t know θ , his expected value will be 
5.125.015.0 =×+×=y , the competition of 
players will have a result in 5.1=w . But, when the 
advertising can transfer quality signal to buyers, 
5.1=w would not able to be Nash equilibrium (Zhang, 
1996).  
 
Traditional trust institution is built by a hypothesis of 
symmetric information games. Besides of a strong 
common share of the institution, it also needs a small 
self-region market. Along with the development of 
technology, the bound of market is more and more 
expanding. The hypothesis of traditional trust institution 
is removing from the fact. For obtaining the symmetric 
information, many other forcing controls are necessary, 
such as quality standard, understanding of craftworks 
and abilities, etc. In fact, the trust has been equal to the 
control. The essence of “dependence and control” has 
brought high cost, and can’t meet the demand of trust in 
the times of global economy. The principal cannot far 
directly control the behavior of the agents because of his 
bounded rationality. Controlling has sharpened the 
contradiction between the principal and agent. 
 
 
3.3 The game of trust in competition  
Though the traditional business environment has 
stronger regional characteristics, the conditions of the 
hypothesis of the trust are easier to realize, the 
controlling, as a kind of ways to form trust, can work in 
a certain extent. With the innovation of technology 
(modern manufacturing, modern transportation and 
modern information) and system (the freedom of trade), 
the modern economy becomes globally day by day, 
precondition of trust through the method of controlling 
has already been out of the existence. Under this 
environment, the agent who is prone to calculativeness 
will not promise openly, so the effective trade can only 
be realized on terms that the trust is restrained from 
reliably supporting (Williamson, 1998). As the 
important displaying form of the technology at the third 
stage, E-business is not only the handed technology, but 
also is the main means to change the environment. The 
development of E-business will have influence on the 
evolution of trust institution. 
 
In E-Business, by the regional difference of culture and 
moral, the belief of traditional trust institution will not 
be more and more common shared. Because of the 
asymmetric information of quality, buyers can only 
observe s  not θ , so the price will only be decided by 
s . Let )1( s=θµ  is the buyer’s posterior probability 
of low quality when he has observed s  that the 
bargainor selected. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium means: 
(1) the bargainor selected )(θs , (2) the buyer knows 
)1( s=θµ  and decides )( sw  by the “ s ” that he 
has observed. The result is: ①by )( sw , )(θs  is the 
best choice of the baigainor when quality is θ ; ②by 
)(θs , )1( s=θµ  is accordant to Bayesian ruler, 
)( sw  is the best choice of  the buyer. 
 
The equilibrium may be pooling or separating. Fist, 
pooling equilibrium (PE) means the bargainor selected 
same advertising in different qualities and won same 
price. By 0)( ≡θs ,  
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
===
===
==
====
5.0)11(
5.0)01(
5.1)1()0(
0)2()1(
:)(
s
s
ww
ss
PE
θµ
θµ
θθ
    (1) 
It means no advertising of any qualities is Pareto 
dominance equilibrium. The buyer considers there is no 
quality signal in advertising, so the price is equal to the 
expected utility. Because of the buyer’s Pareto 
dominance equilibrium is 0),1(,5.1 >≡ θCw , so 
1)( =θs is impossible, the bargainor’s Pareto 
dominance equilibrium is no advertising 
( 0)( =θs )(Zhang, 1996). 
 
Because we assume the buyer will not rework his prior 
probability when he finds 1)( =θs , (PE) is Pareto 
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dominance equilibrium. The invariable prior probability 
in advertising game demands players have share-beliefs 
of sensual knowledge and codified knowledge, by all 
appearances, it could not come to existence in global 
economy and E-business. If the buyer’s posterior 
probability is 0)11( === sθµ , it means the 
quality advertised must be high, the (PE) will not come 
into existence. For by 0)11( === sθµ , when the 
bargainor’s choice is 1)( =θs , the buyer’s choice will 
be 2)1( =w . The high quality will select advertising, 
5.12/12)2,1( =−=== θsU . No advertising is 
poor, 101)2,0( =−=== θsU , so we will have 
the separating equilibrium (SE): 
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
===
===
==
====
0)11(
1)01(
2)1(,1)0(
1)2(,0)1(
:)(
s
s
ww
ss
SE
θµ
θµ
θθ
   (2) 
(SE) is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. When the buyer 
has selected the posterior probability and the price, if 
1)2,0(5.1)2,1( ===>=== θθ sUsU , the 
quality is high, the best strategy is advertising; if 
1)1,1(1)1,0( ===≥=== θθ sUsU , the best 
strategy is no advertising when the quality is low. 
Otherwise, by the baigainor’s choice, the buyer’s 
posterior probability is based on Bayesian ruler, so the 
price strategy is Pareto dominance, and other (SE) isn’t 
being (Zhang, 1996). 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The advertising level is a signal in (SE) which transfers 
information of quality to buyers. Spence-Mirrlees 
condition is the precondition of this game equilibrium. 
When the same advertising is selected, the cost of high 
quality is lesser than low quality , the high quality will 
have enough incentive to separate itself from others by 
advertising. Otherwise, for wining same price, the low 
quality will have enough incentive to simulate the high 
quality by same advertising strategy. Thus the buyer will 
not believe the advertising as a quality signal. It will 
bring on market failure if there is not enough quality 
information in other ways. The trust isn’t being. So we 
will see the conclusions as follows: 
 
1. In global economy and E-business, because of 
scarcity of sensual knowledge, the condition of strong 
ethical hypothesis in traditional trust institution is not 
being. The new trust’s game model should be more and 
more based on “an invisible hand” (Smith, 1776). The 
ethical hypothesis is feeble. 
 
2. In E-Business, Spence-Mirrlees condition makes it 
clear that the system assuring of real advertising is 
necessary. If the discount factor 0>δ , players will 
have enough incentive to tell the truth in infinitely 
repeated games (Rasmusen, 1994). It is necessary to 
build and improve the stable common E-Business 
market by strong legal system. The third party will 
regulate players’ actions in market, such as quality, 
reality of advertising, etc. The certification authorities 
and the continuous open newsreel of business can make 
the cost is too expensive to lie. 
 
3. If the baigainors’ quality information can help buyers 
purchase properly, advertising can improve the effect of 
resource allocation. By taking the advantages of 
E-business that can help to share the mass codified 
knowledge, purchase and supply on-line can bring an 
effect of vendue. The good-right order can translate 
from traditional mode such as prior plan, unite control, 
posterior mediation, into the mode of contract that based 
on real product (Masahiko Aoki, 2001). Lesser 
asymmetry and uncertainty information will make 
enough incentive of the bargainor to improve quality. At 
one time, opening competition can promote monitor 
from man-made to market-made by the endogenous 
punishment mechanism by constantly repeated games. It 
is from control to competition. 
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